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Controversy within Deterrence Theory: Same Cases, Different 
Outcomes 
 
Every distinctive academic discipline has at least one subject or section that is either 
under-investigated or overwhelmed with controversies concerning the subject. For 
international relations, this section is the deterrence theory. The deterrence theory has 
always played an important role within the international relations and it has been 
studied exhaustively, but still, it remains difficult to understand.   
On top of the difficulty to understand the deterrence theory, rather prominent 
researchers have had a disagreement on two important points within the deterrence 
theory. In 1984, Huth and Russett have created a dataset of all the immediate extended 
deterrence encounters they could identify within a certain time lapse, coding their 
deterrence outcomes as either a deterrence success or a deterrence failure. Lebow and 
Stein have revised this dataset and reclassified a majority of the cases as not being an 
immediate extended deterrence encounter at all. Also, Lebow and Stein disagreed with 
the coding of the deterrence outcomes as done by Huth and Russett. These two 
controversies are somewhat remarkable as they embrace two important aspects of the 
testing of extended deterrence: whether a case is an immediate extended deterrence 
encounter and if so, whether this immediate extended deterrence encounter is a 
deterrence success or a deterrence failure. This debate has lead to the statement that 
there are “alarmingly low levels of cross-study reliability” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p.340).   
 
The debate and the research on the coding of deterrence outcomes are important, as it is 
remarkable that there is no consensus on how to code the cases. As pointed out by 
Lebow and Stein, analysts of deterrence have agreed that a widely agreed-upon 
database is a critical precondition for the testing of different and competing theories of 
deterrence. Without a valid and replicable database accepted by the scholars it is 
impossible to test competing theories, and even less possible to dissolve their differing 
predictions (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  This would mean that research within this theory 
becomes highly difficult, as neither valid inductive theory can be formed nor can 
deductive theories be validly tested.  
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Therefore, it is important to know what exactly has constituted these differences in the 
coding of deterrence outcomes in the first place. Once the reasons for the differences 
have been established, it becomes easier to develop a database considered valid and 
reliable by all the scholars with different approaches within the deterrence theory.  
For this reason, I will try to contribute to this debate by researching what explains the 
contrasting interpretations of outcomes of immediate extended deterrence encounters 
between Huth and Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other, and to what 
extent are these reflected in the analysed cases? 
I will argue that there is not a single factor that can explain the different outcomes for all 
the cases. Rather, different factors explain the differences in outcome for each separate 
case. To back up my argument, I will carry out a case study of nine different cases. These 
cases are the only cases Huth and Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the 
other have both identified as immediate extended deterrence encounters. Six of these 
cases are cases where the researchers agree on the deterrence outcomes, the remaining 
three are cases where the deterrence outcomes have been coded differently. I will try to 
show how for each case that has been coded differently, different factors determine the 
differences in deterrence outcomes between Huth and Russett on the one hand and 
Lebow and Stein on the other.  
To lay foundation for my argument, the first section of this thesis will lay out the 
research design of the thesis, followed by a theoretical framework in order to clarify the 
important concepts and theories used for this research. The second section is the actual 
research, where the cases will be analysed and possible factors for agreement and 
variation in deterrence outcomes will be listed. The conclusion will summarize the 
findings and explain the relevance of these findings for the deterrence theory. 
 
Research Design 
 
As the purpose of this paper is to identify the underlying factors that have resulted in 
the difference in coding of deterrence outcomes, an in-depth empirical analysis suits 
best because the knowledge gained from case study and observation can be attached to 
the assessments as done by the researchers. Because the debate between Lebow and 
Stein on the one hand and Huth and Russett on the other is based on the difference in 
their assessment of the outcomes of the cases, single case studies are needed to detect 
 4 
the aspects of the cases that have led to the different outcomes. Therefore, a qualitative 
empirical analysis fits the purpose of this research.  
Because the debate between the two pairs of deterrence researchers has been evolving 
around two issues, we need to distinguish between two major groups of cases: the cases 
that have been assessed by Huth, Russett, Lebow and Stein as cases of immediate 
extended deterrence encounters and cases that Lebow and Stein have rejected. Because 
the other question in this debate is why there is such a big difference in the classification 
of cases as immediate extended deterrence encounters or not. The cases used in this 
research all have to be identified as cases of immediate extended deterrence encounters 
by both groups of researchers, otherwise there will be a huge chance that the 
controversy around this aspect will have an impact on how the deterrence outcomes 
will be criticised. Thus in this research, we will only be looking at cases that have been 
accepted as cases of immediate extended deterrence encounters by both groups of 
researchers.  
When separated, only nine cases of immediate extended deterrence encounters remain. 
These nine cases will be divided into two groups for the research: one group where 
Huth, Russett, Lebow and Stein agree on the outcome of the deterrence case, another 
group where Huth and Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other have 
coded the outcomes of the deterrence encounters as either a deterrence success or a 
deterrence failure differently. The cases that constitute the first group are cases that 
have been identified as a deterrence failure by both groups of researchers: 1914 Austria-
Hungary/ Germany (attacker) versus Serbia (protégé) and Russia (defender); 1914 
Germany (attacker) versus France (protégé) and Britain/ Russia (defender); 1939 Japan 
(attacker) versus Outer-Mongolia (protégé) and USSR (defender); 1939 Germany 
(attacker) versus Poland (protégé) and Britain/ France (defender); 1950 United States 
(attacker) versus North-Korea (protégé) and China (defender); and 1979 China 
(attacker) versus Vietnam (protégé) and USSR (defender).  
The second group of cases consists out of cases that Both Huth and Russett on the one 
hand and Lebow and Stein on the other hand have coded as immediate extended 
deterrence encounters, but have coded differently when it comes to the deterrence 
outcome: 1938 Germany (attacker) versus Czechoslovakia (protégé) and Britain/France 
(defender); 1964 Turkey (attacker) versus Cyprus (protégé) and Greece (defender); and 
1967 Israel (attacker) versus Syria (protégé) and Egypt (defender). Huth and Russett 
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have coded all three cases as deterrence failures, whereas Lebow and Stein have coded 
the cases of 1964 and 1967 as deterrence successes and the case of 1938 as both a 
deterrence success and a deterrence failure.   
 
Out of the total of 67 cases taken from the datasets of Huth and Russett from 1984 and 
1988, there have been only 6 cases which both Huth and Russett on the one hand and 
Lebow and Stein on the other have classified exactly the same- all six as deterrence 
failures. Because of the multitude of cases that have been rejected by Lebow and Stein, it 
is important to analyse these cases they agree on. By constituting explanations for the 
aspects they agree on in these six cases, the differences in the three cases they have 
classified as immediate extended deterrence encounters but coded differently become 
more visible. Hence, this way we can create an overall picture of the situation of aspects 
the researches agree on and aspects that they disagree on.  
As I will be using secondary sources mostly for my summaries of the deterrence 
encounters, I am well aware that my descriptions also might include an unintended bias. 
 
Concepts and Theories 
 
To understand where the controversy is coming from and to understand where the 
dispute fits within the deterrence theory, I will first lay down a fundament for the 
research by describing the deterrence theory and what the debate between Huth and 
Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other is exactly about. The crucial 
concepts within this research and the possible approaches to deterrence theory will be 
defined.  
 
Deterrence theory 
 
Deterrence is known as an old practice that can be seen in many different aspects of the 
human behaviour, and thus also in the international politics. Even though the act has 
already been used in military practice for a long time, it was only from the Cold War on 
when the interest in deterrence theory grew enormous and rapidly. However, we should 
distinguish between deterrence strategy and deterrence theory (Morgan, 2003). Where 
deterrence strategy is about the military aspect, threats and how to communicate the 
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threats in a way that the state adopts to deter, deterrence theory focuses on “the 
underlying principles on which any strategy is to rest” (Morgan, 2003, p.8).  
 
There are many different definitions of the term deterrence, but they all come down to 
the same essence: “that one party prevents another from doing something the first party 
does not want by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does” (Morgan, 
2003, p. 1). Thus a state prevents another state from doing an unwanted act by letting 
the second party fear the consequences. It is about convincing the adversary that his 
costs would outweigh his benefits, in order to prevent an undesirable act (Lebow & 
Stein, 1990).  
An important distinction made is the distinction between deterrence and compellence. 
Whereas deterrence is about preventing an undesired act through the use of threats, 
compellence is about stopping an undesired act. Compellence is defined as “ the use of 
threats to manipulate the behaviour of others so they stop doing something unwanted 
or do something they were not previously doing” (Morgan, 2003, p. 2). Both forms are a 
type of coercive diplomacy and require a rather similar strategy (Harvey, 1997). Even 
though deterrence and compellence are virtually indistinguishable, a distinction still 
needs to be made because analysts recognize compellence to be harder than deterrence 
(Morgan, 2003). They consider it to be more difficult because it is harder to stop people 
from doing something they were already doing than to stop people from doing 
something they have not even started to do so yet (Morgan, 2003).  
 
A difference can be made between general and immediate deterrence. Morgan has 
identified general deterrence as "opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate 
their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack" (Morgan, 
1983, p.30).  Thus, a general deterrence encounter is when a party threatens another 
party to prevent it from doing something undesirable, even though the second party was 
not even planning on doing it.  
Immediate deterrence is more like the original definition of deterrence, “where at least 
one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of 
retaliation in order to prevent it” (Morgan, 1983, p.30). Hence, immediate deterrence 
happens in times of crisis, with specific opponents, whilst general deterrence covers a 
wider range of possibilities that are hard to pin down (Morgan, 2003).  
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Another distinction that can be made is the distinction between direct and extended 
deterrence. Direct deterrence happens when a state uses deterrence to prevent an 
attack on its home territory. In extended deterrence a state uses deterrence to prevent 
an attack on a third party, such as an ally or protégé (Danilovic, 2002).  
The two distinctions shown above can also be melted together, resulting in immediate 
extended deterrence and immediate direct deterrence. Immediate direct deterrence 
indicates a threat used by a state to prevent another state from doing a seriously-
considered undesirable act on their home territory. Immediate extended deterrence 
indicates a threat used by a state to prevent another state from doing a seriously-
considered undesirable attack on a third party such as a protégé or an ally.  
 
To identify a valid immediate deterrence encounter, it must be clear that the challenger 
considered an undesirable attack and he decided against it because the defender 
persuaded him that there would be higher costs than benefits (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  
All the distinctions made above need to be kept in mind to understand the debate that 
will be described below.  
 
Huth and Russett versus Lebow and Stein 
 
The debate used and analysed in this research is a debate between Huth and Russett on 
the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other. This debate is based around a dataset 
created by Huth and Russett in 1984 in their article ‘What Makes Deterrence Work? 
Cases from 1900 to 1980’ and afterwards corrected by Huth and Russett in 1988.  
This dataset was originally composed so they could test an expected utility model they 
laid out in their article (Huth & Russett, 1984). The large-scale dataset was created with 
the purpose to serve as an aid for the checking of their model.  
However, Lebow and Stein decided to analyse this dataset solely and concluded that 
“Huth and Russett do not adequately deal with the problems intrinsic to constructing a 
valid dataset for quantitative analysis” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 336).  
They decided to revise the data set by doing a qualitative case-by-case analysis of the 
data used (Lebow & Stein, 1990). Through this case-by-case analysis, they concluded 
that only 9 out of the original 54 cases have been actual immediate extended deterrence 
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encounters. In 37 of the cases they said they could not find evidence that the alleged 
attacker intended to use force or that the presumed defender practiced deterrence 
(Lebow & Stein, 1990). According to Lebow and Stein, both are necessary conditions for 
valid cases of deterrence. Also, they reclassified four cases as compellence instead of 
deterrence and the remaining cases were classified as ambiguous (Lebow & Stein, 
1990). Moreover, Lebow and Stein found that in many of the cases, the roles of the 
attacker and defender had been improperly appointed and third parties had been 
identified incorrectly. Also, immediate direct deterrence has been confused for 
immediate extended deterrence in some of the cases (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  
Huth’s 1988 collection recoded many data without offering any explanation, but still, the 
problems had not been solved.  
Further, Lebow and Stein disagreed strongly with the coding of the outcomes by Huth 
and Russett.  
The question that arises in this debate is how it is possible that there is such a big 
disagreement on how to test deterrence theory (Herring, 1995).  
There has been no difference in the definitions of immediate extended deterrence used. 
Then, how is it possible that there is such a big difference in the classification of cases as 
extended deterrence encounters or not. This has been one of the big questions within 
the debate, together with the question why Huth and Russett on the one hand and 
Lebow and Stein on the other disagree on the coding of the deterrence outcomes as a 
deterrence success or as a deterrence failure.  
Lebow and Stein say the difference in classification of immediate extended deterrence 
encounters derives from the fact that the definition of immediate extended deterrence is 
applied differently to the cases (Lebow & Stein, 1990). They are also of the opinion that 
they differ in the assessment of a threat to attack. Whereas Huth and Russett see a threat 
of attack as an indicator of intention to attack, Lebow and Stein require independent 
evidence of a challenger’s intentions (Lebow & Stein, 1990). 
On the other hand, Huth and Russett argue that Lebow and Stein do not recognize the 
difficulties of using documentary evidence. They say decision-makers might be limited 
in being aware of their own intentions, they might not articulate their intentions when 
they do know them or their intentions might change without an explicit expression of 
this change. Decision-makers might also express conflicting intentions (Herring, 1995).  
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The debate is a rather complex one. The second aspect of the debate, about the 
disagreement on the coding of deterrence outcomes as a deterrence success or as a 
deterrence failure, will be elaborated in this research.  
 
The research 
 
As already mentioned above, Lebow and Stein revised a total of  67 cases taken from the 
1984 and the 1988 datasets of Huth and Russett. However, it is hardly possible to 
replicate the data Huth and Russett reproduced in their article, as they have not really 
given a justification for both their case selection and their coding (Lebow & Stein, 1990). 
The consequence of their lack of justification is that the research of Huth and Russett 
seems less reliable, as reliability depends on whether or not the results of a certain 
research are repeatable (Bryman, 2012). Lebow and Stein have done a case-by-case 
analysis of the data produced by Huth and Russet, keeping the denomination of the 
attacker, protégé and defender constant in the dataset they produced. Of the 67 cases 
that Lebow and Stein revised in their research, they only agreed on 9 cases from the 
1984 dataset and on one extra case that was added to the 1988 dataset to be an 
immediate extended deterrence encounter.  
As the case of 1970 between Syria as attacker, Jordan as protégé and Israel as the 
defender is partially defined as a deterrence failure and partially as a compellance 
success by Lebow and Stein, this case will not be added to further analysis, as I will only 
be looking to pure immediate extended deterrence encounters.  
 
It is remarkable that none of the cases that Huth and Russett have classified as 
deterrence successes have been classified as actual deterrence encounters by Lebow 
and Stein.  All cases that Huth and Russett coded as a deterrence success were rejected 
by Lebow and Stein because they considered these cases as either ambiguous, a case of 
compellance or not a deterrence encounter at all.  
 Lebow and Stein reclassified only three out of these nine cases, two as a deterrence 
success and one as a partial deterrence success and a partial deterrence failure.  
They disagreed on the classification of a success and failure in one third of all the 
immediate extended deterrence encounters recognized by both. Out of the total original 
datasets from Huth and Russett, Lebow and Stein only identified 4,47% as an immediate 
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extended deterrence success. One might conclude that the biggest issue concerns the 
identification of a deterrence success, as Lebow and Stein did not recognize any of the 
deterrence successes as classified by Huth and Russett.  
 
Agreement among the researchers- immediate extended deterrence outcomes coded 
the same 
 
As mentioned, only 6 cases have been coded the same by both Huth and Russett on the 
one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other. These cases have been depicted in the table 
below.  
To identify why both have marked these cases as deterrence failures, we first need to 
look at their definitions of an immediate extended deterrence encounter and a 
deterrence failure.  
As Lebow and Stein observe, the definition of an immediate extended deterrence 
employed by Huth, Russett, Lebow and Stein, is the same: “immediate extended 
deterrence occurs only when an attacker contemplates military action against another 
country and a third party commits itself to the defense of the country threatened with 
attack” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 342). In all six of the cases, the defender has made it 
clear that they would commit themselves to defending their protégé. For case 1, Russia 
made it clear they would protect Serbia if Germany and Austria-Hungary were to declare 
a war against Serbia. For case 2, the British cabinet made it clear to protect France 
against German attack on August 2nd, 1914 (Danilovic, 2002). When it comes to case 5, 
China was afraid for a reunification of North and South Korea by the United States and 
therefore issued a verbal threat to the United States that was backed up by a military 
deployment (George & Smoke, 1974).  
Before the Sino-Vietnamese War of case 6, Russia had signed a peace treaty with 
Vietnam including an agreement on mutual military assistance (Yee, 1980). By becoming 
a full member of COMECON in June 1978, Vietnam formally entered the Soviet Camp and 
Russia made it clear that they would defend Vietnam (Yee, 1980). 
 
When it comes to the first part of the definition, where the attacker contemplates a 
military action against the protégé, Lebow and Stein argue that the difference in 
assessment relies on the difference in assessments of the threats to attack (Lebow & 
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Stein, 1990). Lebow and Stein say they require evidence of the intentions of a potential 
challenger, while according to Lebow and Stein, Huth and Russett rely on a threat to 
attack as an indicator of the intention to attack (Lebow & Stein, 1990). For example, for 
case 1 and case 2, which are both components of the First World War, Germany’s and 
Austria-Hungary’s threats for attacks were not only bluffing. Their intention to attack in 
case 1 becomes evident after Archduke Francis Ferdinand was shot by Gavrilo Princip in 
Sarajevo. That the threat to attack in case 2 would not remain unfounded, was made 
clear through Germany’s behaviour towards other countries during the First World War 
(Danilovic, 2002).  
 
Table 1: Immediate extended deterrence cases with same outcomes1 
Case Year Attacker Protégé Defender Outcome Huth, 
Russett, Lebow 
and Stein 
1 1914 Austria- 
Hungary/ 
Germany 
Serbia Russia Deterrence 
Failure 
2 1914 Germany France Britain/ Russia Deterrence 
Failure 
3 1939 Japan Outer- 
Mongolia 
USSR Deterrence 
Failure 
4 1939 Germany Poland Britain/ France Deterrence 
Failure 
5 1950 United 
States 
North- 
Korea 
China Deterrence 
Failure 
6 1979 China Vietnam USSR Deterrence 
Failure 
 
Above is described why the two teams of researchers have agreed on the classification 
as an immediate extended deterrence encounter. The next step is to analyse what Huth, 
Russett, Lebow and Stein agree on when it comes to the classification as a deterrence 
                                                        
1 The data in this table are a composition of the data from Huth and Russett (1988) and 
Lebow and Stein (1990). 
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failure.  Huth and Russett define a deterrence failure as a military attack: “a government-
sanctioned engagement of its regular armed forces of the protégé and/or its defender, 
resulting in more than 250 fatalities” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 344). Lebow and Stein 
consider a deterrence encounter to have failed when the defender does not carry 
through their commitment in the face of the threats of the challenger, or when the 
challenger persists with their action, even though proscribed by the defender (Lebow & 
Stein, 1990). These two definitions are not contrasting, but complementing each other. 
All six cases have resulted in more than 200 casualties (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  Also, all 
six have resulted in a military attack: case 1 and case 2 in the First World War; case 3 in 
the Nomonhan incident; case 4 in the Second World War; case 5 in the Korean War of 
1979 and case 6 in Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 (Danilovic, 2002). In all six cases, the 
threat was not estimated as credible and the challenger committed the action 
proscribed. Thus, the six cases analysed meet the criteria of both definitions.  
These findings are not surprising, as the difference in definition of a deterrence failure 
hardly accounts for the difference in coding of the cases (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  
 
Another reason for the agreement on the coding of these cases is the availability of 
sources on the intention of the attacker. Lebow and Stein have accused Huth and Russett 
of assessing threats to attack as intentions to attack (Lebow & Stein, 1990). They argue 
that a threat to attack does not always show the intention of the challenger, as he may be 
bluffing. Lebow and Stein require evidence that the challenger considered an attack and 
that the defender attempted to deter (Lebow & Stein, 1990). The six cases analysed have 
all resulted in relatively known wars with enough evidence and sources of the 
challenger’s intentions. Hence, one main reason of agreement on these cases is the 
availability of documents with definitive information about the intentions. Without 
these documents, Lebow and Stein would have coded the cases as ambiguous.  
 
At last, the appointment of the roles of the challenger and defender in these six cases are 
evident in the historical descriptions of these cases. As will become visible in the next 
section, a difference in appointment of the challenger, protégé and defender can lead to 
differences in deterrence outcomes. However, these cases show a clear distinguishment 
between the challenger and defender. 
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Disagreement among the researchers- immediate extended deterrence outcomes coded 
differently 
 
The three cases of immediate extended deterrence, which the researches have coded 
differently, are depicted below in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Immediate extended deterrence cases with different outcomes2 
Case Year Attacker Protégé Defender Outcome 
Huth and 
Russett 
Outcome 
Lebow 
and Stein 
7 1938 Germany Czechoslovakia Britain/France Deterrence 
Failure 
Deterrence 
Failure, 
Deterrence 
Success 
8 1964 Turkey Cyprus Greece Deterrence 
Failure 
Deterrence 
Success 
9 1967 Israel Syria Egypt Deterrence 
Failure 
Deterrence 
Success 
 
To understand where these differences in classification are coming from, we first need a 
short summary of the deterrence encounters mentioned above. Afterwards we will look 
at the concepts, conditions and methodology used by the two different camps, in order 
to find an explanation for the disagreement between the two pairs of deterrence 
scholars.  
 
Germany (attacker) versus Czechoslovakia (protégé) and Britain/France (defenders) 
1938- Munich Crisis 
 
The three million people of German origin in Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, triggered 
Hitler’s plan for the occupation of Czechoslovakia (Encyclopædia Brittannica, n.d.). As 
Czechoslovakia had an alliance with France and relied on their military assistance, 
France and Britain were responsible for many of the decisions during this case, with 
Britain being France’s treaty obligation (Huth, 1988). After previous attempts to give 
Sudetenland to Hitler on September 22nd in order to avoid war with Germany, a final 
effort was made through a four-power conference. The Munich Pact they signed on 
                                                        
2 The data in this table are a composition of the data from Huth and Russett (1984) and 
Lebow and Stein (1990). 
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September 30th, 1938, stated that the German army could complete the occupation of 
the Sudetenland by October 10th (Encyclopædia Brittannica, n.d.). Unfortunately, this 
agreement did not last for long, because Hitler’s armies entered the rest of 
Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and occupied those parts that had not been given to 
Germany in the Munich pact (Lebow & Stein, 1990). 
 
Huth and Rusett find that the defenders in this case did not actually intervene (Huth & 
Russett, 1984). They consider the verbal warnings to not have been enough: Britain and 
France were unwilling to fight a protracted war in support of Czechoslovakia (Huth, 
1988). Because of the Munich Pact and the permission to occupy Sudetenland, this 
deterrence encounter had failed.  As already mentioned, a state is deterred when it is 
prevented by another state from doing an unwanted act by letting the state fear the 
consequences of the act. Even though Britain and France tried to convince Hitler that 
costs of his act would outweigh the benefits, Hitler still accomplished his original plan. 
Thus, deterrence had failed.  
 
However, some words spoken by Hitler in 1945, explain why Lebow and Stein marked 
this as a deterrence success. In 1945, Hitler blamed himself for not standing firm with 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which, in his eyes, would have been a short war only. 
When explaining what went wrong in 1938, he said: “we ought to have attacked in 1938. 
It was the last chance we had of localizing the war” (Overy, 1999, p. 191). As Hitler said 
by himself, if he would have had attacked immediately, Britain and France would have 
remained passive and he would have gained more time (Overy, 1999, p.191). But things 
did not go according to Hitler’s original plan. France and Britain certainly had an effect 
on the course of the crisis, and Hitler was diverted from his original plan by the threats 
of Britain and France. Still, Hitler achieved his main goal, maybe not through his initial 
strategy, but a war had not been avoided. As military combat is one of the main criteria 
for failure of deterrence, this case cannot be seen as a partial deterrence success as 
Lebow and Stein conclude. 
 
Turkey (attacker) versus Cyprus (protégé) and Greece (defender) 1964 
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When in 1963 Archbishop Makarios III, the Greek-Cypriot president, decided to 
introduce a number of constitutional alterations in order to significantly reduce the 
political power of the Turkish Cypriots, a communal uproar by the Turkish community 
began (Lebow & Stein, 1990). In June, Washington received information about a Turkish 
decision to start an invasion in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Under Secretary 
Ball went to Ankara with the message that the US would suspend military assistance 
against the Soviet Union if Turkey would proceed with its invasion (Lebow & Stein, 
1990). However, in July the Greeks started an offensive in order to diminish Turkish 
areas on the island. The United Nations forces withdrew and the offensive ended in 
August, when Turkish air forces intervened (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  
 
Lebow and Stein consider this case to be the strongest case of immediate extended 
deterrence in the two data collections as produced by Huth and Russett (Lebow & Stein, 
1990). Because of this statement, it is remarkable that Huth and Russett have dismissed 
this case in their dataset of 1988. Huth and Russett consider Turkey to be the attacker in 
this case and Greece to be the defender. However, Lebow and Stein have considered the 
roles of the defender and attacker to be the other way around. “Turkey- not Greece, as 
Huth and Russett allege- practiced deterrence and then compellence to protect the lives 
and the political rights of the Turkish Cypriot community” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 361). 
From the historical analysis and the evidence that president Makarios wanted to change 
the status quo on Cyprus, it becomes clear that indeed Turkey had to step in, in order to 
protect the Turkish-Cypriot community (Encyclopædia Brittannica, n.d.). Thus based on 
the case study Lebow and Stein have had a better assessment of the roles in the case. 
When Turkey is seen as the defender and Greece as the challenger, this deterrence 
encounter ought to be seen as a deterrence success, as the attacker did not attain its 
principal goals.  
 
Also, Lebow and Stein criticize Huth and Russett for not mentioning the role of the 
United States in this encounter (Lebow & Stein, 1990). The United States has played a 
huge role in twice deterring a Turkish attack and in the acceptance of the arrangements 
by the Greek and Cypriot community in order to prevent an unnecessary attack by the 
Turkish (Lebow & Stein, 1990). As this case can be divided into multiple encounters, 
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certain encounters could be seen as a deterrence success if Huth and Russett had 
identified the United States as a defender and Turkey as an attacker.  
 
Israel (attacker) versus Syria (protégé) and Egypt (defender) 1967- Six Day War 
 
The encounter between Israel, Syria and Egypt was a brief war that took place between 
the 5th and 10th of July 1967 and is also known as the Third Arab-Israeli war 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.). Rather inaccurate reports were published in May by the 
Soviet intelligence stating that Israel was planning on a campaign against Syria 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.). After seeing the sudden mobilization of the Arabs on the 
side of Syria, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack in the morning of June 5th, starting the 
Six Day War. The war had taken its toll on the Arab countries, with 11.000 Egyptian 
casualties, 6.000 Jordan casualties and 1.000 Syrian casualties, compared to the 700 
Israeli casualties (Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.).  
 
Huth and Russett should have mentioned the whole Arab alliance as defenders, as it was 
not only Egypt that participated, but also Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d.). With all the casualties and the fact that Israel conquered 
a, for them important area - East-Jerusalem, deterrence has failed according to both 
definitions utilized by the researchers. Also, it is remarkable that the deterrence 
encounter started based on a rather inaccurate report about Israel. In Israel’s eyes, the 
Arab alliance prepared an attack so they had to react before the Arab alliance. However, 
a pre-emptive strike is not the same as a threat to attack, so the roles should not be 
turned around here. 
 
Opposing perspectives on deterrence outcomes- explanation 
 
The three cases depicted above have been interpreted differently by Huth and Russett 
on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other. As deterrence encounters do not 
exist out of only one move, but rather out of multiple moves back and forth between the 
attacker and defender, analyzing the cases becomes useful to understand which aspects 
of the case have been important to each researcher. Subjectivity always explains a small 
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variation, but it cannot be the reason for such a big difference. There might have been 
multiple reasons for different interpretations, which will all be discussed below.  
 
Conceptual operationalization- explanation 
 
Many researches have come up with the possibility that Huth and Lebow have utilized 
different definitions of what they suppose to be a success or a failure of a deterrence 
encounter. In order to see if this is true we ought to look at the different criteria used by 
the researchers for assessment of the deterrence encounters.  
Huth and Russett defined a deterrence failure as a military attack: “a government-
sanctioned engagement of its regular armed forces in combat with the regular armed 
forces of the protégé and/or its defender, resulting in more than 250 fatalities. Once this 
level of casualty has been reached, subsequent events become a matter of ‘intrawar’ 
deterrence” (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 505). Huth and Russett also consider a deterrence 
encounter a failure when the attacker gained its principal goals, even though fatalities 
were minimal and instances when the territory of the protégé has been occupied by the 
attacker for a several years (Huth & Russett, 1984, p.505).  
According to this definition, all three cases summarized above should indeed be coded 
as a deterrence failure. In the case of Germany in 1938, the attacker gained its principal 
goals without the necessary fatalities. In the case of Israel 1967, the fatalities of the 
combat have been almost 19.000 and Israel occupied a significant amount of Syrian 
territory.  
Lebow and Stein go in against one of the criteria utilized by Huth and Russett by saying 
that “the operationalization of deterrence theory by any arbitrary number of battle 
deaths is not derived from any theory of deterrence” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 344).  
Instead, Lebow and Stein consider deterrence to have failed when a challenger commits 
the action the defender proscribed, or when the defender does not stand firm with his 
commitment in the face of the challenger’s threats and demands (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  
According to this definition, the case of Germany in 1938 should be considered a 
deterrence failure by Lebow and Stein, because Britain and France did not stand firm 
with their commitment to Czechoslovakia by signing the Munich Pact and leaving 
Czechoslovakia to their fate. However, Lebow and Stein also coded this case as a partial 
deterrence success, so other explanations must be found for this particular case. 
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Comparing the conditions used in order to identify a deterrence failure by the two 
different groups of researches, we can indeed see a difference. Where the criteria of 
Lebow and Stein are based solely on the axioms of an immediate extended deterrence 
encounter, Huth and Russett add a few criteria that have not derived directly from 
deterrence theory. They both agree on the condition that, when a challenger goes 
through with its intended action and achieves its goals, the deterrence of the defender 
has failed.   
Lebow and Stein recognize there are differences between the definitions of what a 
deterrence failure is. Yet, it explains hardly any variation in the coding (Lebow & Stein, 
1990).  
When looking at the criteria for a deterrence success, Lebow and Stein say evidence is 
required that a challenger considered an attack or a proscribed action, but decided not 
to continue the act because the defender assured the challenger that there would be 
serious and unacceptable consequences (Lebow & Stein, 1990). Again, Lebow and Stein 
based their criteria solely on the postulates of theories of deterrence. They concluded 
that, when reliable evidence is lacking, it is not possible to make any judgement about 
the coding of the deterrence encounter outcome (Lebow & Stein, 1990). Huth and Rusett 
did not give an explicit detailed condition for what they considered to be a deterrence 
success. Rather, they were trying to find criteria so they would be able to predict 
whether a deterrence encounter would be a success in the future. But what they 
consider to be a success has been based on the same postulates Lebow and Stein have 
used. Now it becomes rather surprising that the researchers ended up with different 
results, because, as Fearon also already pointed out, their definitions of a deterrence 
success have both been taken from the postulates of rational deterrence theory (Fearon, 
2002).  
Based on this comparison and the fact that it is only accountable for a minimalistic 
variation, other explanations must be found.  
 
Quantitative versus Qualitative & Crisis outcome versus Causal Relation- explanation 
 
Another variation that might have an effect on the difference in deterrence outcome 
between Huth and Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other is because 
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the two camps of researches have executed different types of research. Huth and Russett 
have done a more large-scale quantitative analysis of the cases so they could use the 
data for further research in their article. The article was not purely about classifying 
data, but about creating an expected-utility model that could be tested on the cases 
(Huth & Russett, 1984). In contrast to this research, Lebow and Stein only focused on 
the reclassification of the dataset created by Huth and Russett. Lebow and Stein 
employed a case-by-case analysis of the data and had a more qualitative working 
method. This difference can also be explained in terms of difference in archetypal 
approaches. Lebow and Stein use a more psychological/case-study archetype while 
Huth and Russett have based their archetype on the axiomatic approach of 
microeconomics, resulting in different methodologies (Downs, 1989). 
Directly related to this difference, I find that Huth and Russett have been focusing much 
more on the crisis outcome of the cases to base their classification on. When comparing 
the different classifications of Huth and Lebow, the classification of the cases described 
above is a deterrence failure according to Huth and Russett based on how the crisis has 
ended. The cases/crises have been analysed as if they involve only one encounter, 
whereupon the crisis outcomes have been coded based on the extent to which the actors 
achieved their objects (Herring, 1995).  
This approach is different from the approach used by Lebow and Stein. Because Lebow 
and Stein made use of a case-by-case analysis, the cases have not been reflected as single 
encounters, but rather as multiple. This way, they really searched for the cause and 
consequence of every separate deterrence exchange in the deterrence encounter. This 
also explains why it is possible that Lebow and Stein have coded the case with Germany 
as attacker, Czechoslovakia as protégé and France/Britain as defenders both a 
deterrence failure and deterrence success. Where Huth and Russett have been looking 
purely at the crisis outcome, Lebow and Stein have been looking at each separate 
deterrence encounter. This also becomes visible when Lebow and Stein say that Huth 
and Russett ignored the role of the United States in the case of 1964 between Turkey 
and Cyprus/Greece, where the United States deterred a Turkish attack twice (Lebow & 
Stein, 1990). Huth and Russett did not mention the role of the United States in this 
encounter because they did not analyse the case as multiple encounters.   
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Appointment of a challenger/ protégé / defender- explanation 
 
As already mentioned before, Lebow and Stein did not rename the challenger, protégé 
and defender in the dataset they used from Huth and Russett. However, in some parts of 
their research, they certainly did show their disagreement with the classification of 
challenger, protégé and defender as labelled by Huth and Russett. They say “in many of 
the 54 cases, we find that attacker and defender are improperly designated, third parties 
are incorrectly identified as either targets of attack or deterrence” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, 
p. 337). This is also the case with the case of Turkey and Greece in 1964, where Lebow 
and Stein state that “Turkey- not Greece, as Huth and Russett allege- practiced 
deterrence and then compellence to protect the lives and political rights of the Turkish-
Cypriot community” (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 361).  When looking at the description of 
the case above, I agree with Lebow & Stein that the roles of Greece and Turkey should be 
switched, as the Greek-Cypriot president Makarios announced he wanted to change the 
status quo, and Turkey wanted to protect their community on Cyprus.  
 
Even though Lebow and Stein did not change the original challenger, protégé and 
defender denominations, other researchers did make new datasets. In her book When 
The Stakes Are High, Danilovic has created her own dataset with cases of extended 
immediate deterrence among major powers between 1895 and 1985. The outcomes of 
Huth, Russett, Lebow, Stein and Danilovic are depicted in Table 3 below.  
As we can see, the case of 1967 coded as Israel (attacker), Syria (protégé) and Egypt 
(defender) has been interpreted totally different by Danilovic.  Danilovic has divided the 
encounter of the Six Day War in two separate encounters. What is remarkable is that 
Israel, Syria and Egypt have all three been put in the category of protégé: Syria and 
Egypt together in 1967a and Israel in 1967b. In the summary of the Six Day War above, 
the roles of the USSR and of the United States are not clarified. What becomes clear from 
the classifications of Danilovic is that the United States is Israel’s defender and the USSR 
is Syria’s and Egypt’s defender. Danilovic identifies two different encounters with the 
roles of the challenger and defender switched. The first one with the US as a challenger 
and the USSR as a defender has been marked as a deterrence failure. This encounter 
comes closest to the summary given above. Encounter 1967b with the USSR as a 
challenger and the US as a defender is not visible in the summary of the case. Even with 
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the two superpowers described as defender and challenger, the outcome of 1967a 
equals the outcome given by Huth and Russett, where the deterrence against Israel/US 
has failed.  
The classifications of challenger/ protégé/ defender do matter as Danilovic has shown 
with the case of 1967. This means that the difference in outcomes by Huth and Russett 
on the one and Lebow and Stein on the other might also depend on different encounters 
seen as the Six Day War. Huth and Russett have probably based their deterrence 
encounter outcome on the same encounter as Danilovic did in 1967a. A different 
interpretation of challenger/ protégé/ defender thus might lead to different deterrence 
outcomes. 
Table 3: Deterrence roles and Outcomes according to Huth and Russett, Lebow 
and Stein and Danilovic3 
 
Yea
rs 
Challe
nger 
HR & 
LS 
Challenger 
Danilovic 
Protégé 
HR & LS 
Protégé 
Danilovic 
Defen
der 
HR & 
LS 
Defender 
Danilovic 
Outco
me 
HR 
Outco
me LS 
Outcome 
Danilovic 
1
9
3
8
 
Germa
ny 
Germany Czechoslo
vakia 
Czechoslovak
ia 
United 
Kingd
om/ 
Franc
e 
United 
Kingdom/ 
France 
DF DS/ 
DF 
DF 
1
9
6
4
 
Turkey - Cyprus - Greec
e 
- DF DS - 
1
9
6
7
 
Israel a. US 
 
 
b. US
SR 
Syria a. Egy
pt/ 
Syri
a 
b. Isra
el 
 
Egypt a. US
SR 
 
b. US 
DF DS a. D
F 
 
b. D
S 
 
                                                        
3 The data used in the table above is a composition of the data from Huth and Russett 
(1984), Lebow and Stein (1990) and Danilovic (2002). Official denomination for the 
outcomes used by Danilovic have been either war or Acq(challenger) or Acq(defender). 
Acquiescence by the challenger implies a deterrence success; acquiescence by the 
defender implies a deterrence failure. The denominations of the deterrence outcomes 
have been adjusted to the denominations used by Huth, Russett, Lebow and Stein. DS 
stands for Deterrence Success and DF for Deterrence Failure. 
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Conclusion 
 
The debate between Huth and Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the 
other has been one of essential importance, as their controversy has been about two 
important aspects of the testing of extended deterrence: whether a case is an immediate 
extended deterrence encounter and if so, whether this immediate extended deterrence 
encounter is a deterrence success or a deterrence failure.  
The purpose of this research has been to identify what explains the contrasting 
interpretations of outcomes of immediate extended deterrence encounters between 
Huth and Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other, and to what extent 
these explanations have been reflected in the analysed cases.  
In order to find these explanations, nine cases of immediate extended deterrence have 
been analysed. For the six cases that the researches have coded the same, the agreement 
can be explained by clear documents that show definitive information about the 
intention of the challenger and where the appointment of the roles of the challenger and 
defender become evident. As for the cases the researches have disagreed on, it can be 
concluded that there is not a single factor that can explain the variation in deterrence 
outcome for all of the case studies with different outcomes. Rather, certain factors have 
been able to explain variations in one specific case, while other factors have been able to 
explain variations in another case.  
When looking at the case of Germany versus Czechoslovakia, Britain and France in 1938, 
conceptual operationalization could not explain the difference in outcome. Instead, this 
particular case might be explained by the fact that Huth and Russett have used a 
quantitative research method and Lebow and Stein a qualitative method. Huth and 
Russett have been looking only at the crisis outcome, which was the Munich pact and 
thus a deterrence failure. Lebow and Stein have looked at the relation between cause 
and consequence, and therefore linked the consequence of postponement of war to the 
deterrence encounter, stating it has been a deterrence success. Because of the division in 
separate deterrence encounters, Lebow and Stein also recognized the deterrence failure 
in the case.  
With the case of Turkey versus Cyprus and Greece in 1964, the variation in deterrence 
outcome can be mainly explained by a different appointment of the roles of defender 
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and challenger. Because Lebow and Stein saw Turkey as the defender instead of the 
attacker, they have coded the deterrence encounter as a success instead of a failure. 
Finally, with the case of Israel versus Syria and Egypt in 1967, the difference in 
deterrence outcome can be explained by a combination of different roles of challenger 
and defender and the fact that this case is build out of multiple deterrence encounters.  
Thus, one single, all-embracing factor that can explain all differences in deterrence 
outcomes cannot be found. Instead, separate factors can explain the differences in 
deterrence outcomes for separate cases. These findings are useful for deterrence theory, 
as most researches have been trying to find an all-embracing factor that can explain the 
differences in deterrence outcomes for every disputed case. However, it might be more 
useful to look at the factors for each separate disputed case, to prevent discarding of a 
certain factor or approach as a whole.  
Heterogeneity of approaches might be most useful in the early developing stages of a 
field.  
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